For over 75 years, the UN system has provided a forum for multilateral conflict resolution and has achieved significant successes. Pressure from civil society, NGOs, and protests have thereby often played a vital role. Despite achievements such as agreements on arms limitation, peacekeeping operations, and emergency relief, frustration with the UN and its failures to enable international cooperation and non-violent conflict resolution has grown. What opportunities and obstacles exist for civil society engagement to breathe life into the forums of multilateral dialogue?
Bains des Pâquis, Genève
Photo: David Kretonic
Coinciding with the 40th anniversary symposium of W&F[1] on October 6th/7th, 2023 in Bonn, violence escalated into a new war in Israel-Palestine. The attacks and the massacre by Hamas and the subsequent collective punishment of the civilian population of Gaza by the Israeli military have since caused daily horror. The UN has dealt with no conflict in its history as frequently and intensively as the Israeli-Palestinian one. Yet failed peace negotiations, disregarded resolutions, and ongoing violations of international law have led to massive disappointments, particularly among the affected civilian populations. Today, the numerous public statements which call for peace make hardly any appeal to the UN. However, UN institutions would have the opportunity to impose peace plans and sanction violations of international law, but they often fall far short of their potential and actual goals. It is too simplistic to criticize the UN itself for this failure, as it is the current 193 member states that give the UN its significance and enforcement power.
Civil Society and its Representation in UN Institutions
In the realm of international cooperation and conflict resolution “civil society” is often addressed alongside state actors. However, it is often unclear who or what is meant by “civil society”. Andreas Zumach[2] pointed out (during the panel “Civil Society and the UN” at the W&F Symposium in Bonn) that the term “civil society” practically did not exist before the end of the Cold War. Until then, it was more about “thematic pressure movements such as the women’s movement, environmental movement, anti-nuclear movement, peace movement, or the then-called Third World solidarity movement.” Video clips recalling the founding period of W&F (the evening before the panel) vividly illustrated this: During demonstrations against the NATO double-track decision, in Bonn alone around 150,000 protested, and nation-wide several hundred thousand persons,gathered with the peace movement.
From the early 1990s onwards, new terminologies such as “social movements” and eventually “civil society” were increasingly used in research. Zumach recalled that at that time, civil society mainly referred to organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in the field of human rights or large organisations like the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). However, since 2000, the terminology has become more complex : Following drastic budget cuts within the UN (ten percent of positions were cut without discussion of priorities) the then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in Davos the need for new “stakeholders” in society, thus appealing to the responsibility of multinational corporations. The so-called “Global Compact” not only included traditional human rights organisations, but also business corporations, who henceforth could consider themselves as civil society actors and UN partners with nine very broadly defined commitments to human rights issues. Many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) criticised the lack of binding standards of the “Global Compact”, but some, including Amnesty International, also joined the pact.
Institutionalised Participation
The area within the UN system where the participation of NGOs is at least formally and most extensively regulated is the human rights field. In the Human Rights Council (Human Rights Commission before 2006) NGOs have a formal right to participate, speak, and submit proposals. They cannot vote; the voting rights still lie with the states. Expanding these participation opportunities to other UN bodies would be an important component to further ensure the protection of human rights. NGOs could thus advocate more strongly for the rights of civilian populations—especially when states fail to adequately fulfil these duties or when multinational corporations undermine human rights standards. However, an increasing number of states (such as China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia) are attempting to restrict the participation and influence of NGOs in multilateral negotiations within and outside the UN system in response to the successes and reports of human rights organisations.
Successes for Civil Society
It is debatable which groups present themselves or become accredited under the label of “civil society” at UN forums. Nevertheless the most significant international agreements since the end of the Cold War have only been achieved through strong engagement from global coalitions of NGOs both within and outside the UN. Some successes of civil society pressure from recent years include:
- The legally binding Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons of 2017, ratified in 2021, which can be considered the greatest success of the peace movement.
- A broad international coalition of over 1,000 NGOs advocated for the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 1998 and ratified in 2003.
- The Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Climate Agreements (2016).
- The bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the USA for the disarmament of short- and medium-range missiles (INF Treaty), signed in 1987 and ratified in 1998.
- The agreements to ban anti-personnel mines (1997) and cluster munitions (2008) were achieved under pressure from an international coalition of NGOs outside the UN and have since gained 122 signatory states.
Forms and Formats of Action
While the day-to-day management of organisations is often demanding (in terms of time, money, energy, and travel), the pressure “at home”, that is, on representatives of one’s own government, often proves to be the most effective, Zumach summarised. Actions directed by major NGOs at the sites where multilateral negotiations take place often have less impact, as diplomats and elected representatives are influenced in their voting behaviour by the mood of the population.
Yet, there are also remarkable examples of NGO engagement at the actual sites of multilateral negotiation forums. Zumach referred here to the negotiations for the hazardous waste agreement. Shortly before the start of negotiations, Greenpeace brought containers of hazardous waste directly to the conference venue in a highly publicised action (“Toxic Trade Campaign”). This impressed the diplomats so much that eventually – and after several special European states sessions – a majority was won for the ban on exports.
Other actions, however, such as a vigil held for over 20 years in Geneva against a secret agreement stating that the WHO has no right to care for victims of radioactive radiation, have achieved nothing – there was a lack of civil society pressure in the relevant member countries. Similarly, in the case of Syria, there was a lack of significant civil society pressure to end the war and reach an agreement.
In general, diplomatic missions – at least from democratic states – are guided by the mood of their respective electorate and are therefore easier to influence through protests “at home”. To influence the mood or voting behaviour directly at the site of negotiations requires strategically clever and media-effective actions.
Example Syria: Civil Society between Neglect and “Local Turn”
The ambivalent relationship between civil society actors and the UN is particularly evident in the case of Syria. When protests began in Syria in 2011, the few existing civil society organisations and interest groups were strictly regulated by the regime and freedom of expression was scarcely possible. As people took to the streets with calls for freedom and dignity, an often creative activism emerged. Syrian “activists” subsequently received international attention as representatives of Syrian civil society – yet the desire for the opening of the country and the assertion of international norms for the Syrian population was bitterly disappointed.
During the so-called Geneva negotiation rounds (2012, 2014, 2016, 2017), numerous activists and opposition representatives also participated. However, the conflicting parties did not agree on a political solution. At best, concessions by the regime to establish humanitarian corridors were counted as “successes” – while the regime’s sieges of residential areas (as well as the use of chemical weapons and barrel bombs) are already at the first place not compatible with international law. Faced with blockades in the Security Council, UN mediators failed to enforce a peace plan. Similarly, no breakthrough was achieved in other formats outside the UN (such as the Astana formats), and the participation of civil society varied from time to time significantly.
Building on her research on the Syrian diaspora, Maria Hartmann described at the W&F Symposium how Syrian human rights activists persistently appealed to UN institutions. Most recently, human rights organisations successfully advocated for an independent UN institution for missing persons, the “UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic”. However, legally relevant successes were achieved elsewhere. For example, in 2022, invoking the principle of universal jurisdiction, two Syrian war criminals were convicted by the Higher Administrative Court in Koblenz (Germany). Despite the significance of these achievements, they are not sufficient to counter the blatant impunity with which the regime operates, Hartmann argued, adding that this has devastating implications for other rulers and offers no prospect of return for the many refugees.
During my research in Lebanon on displacement from Syria[3], I observed the widespread legal insecurity of the civilian population also on another level: even though political activism that emerged during the protests found new opportunities for organising in exile, the humanitarian crisis caused by the war often led activists to focus on humanitarian relief. As international humanitarian action usually goes hand in hand with a commitment to the humanitarian principle of “neutrality”, advocacy for civil rights or a rights-based status in exile then took a back seat in much of the activism. This consequently led to a de-politicisation of the opportunities for civil society to make itself heard within internationalised structures and contexts.
In Lebanon, I often heard criticism from individuals who themselves came from Syria and then engaged in providing assistance to other refugees locally. While these activists or civil society actors generally acknowledged the importance of international engagement, they also lamented that their knowledge of local conditions was not adequately taken into account, and that UN engagement was detached and overpriced. While they were approached as local actors in terms of their knowledge (e.g. for so-called “needs assessments”), they had little decision-making power over the allocation of resources. Procedural standards, language, and professional administration sometimes acted as exclusion criteria for local initiatives interested in collaborating with international organisations.
In view of criticisms like these, the importance of locally rooted approaches has increasingly been recognised internationally. In the humanitarian field, the “Grand Bargain” agreed upon by donor countries and international organisations in 2016 aims, among other things, to strengthen the representation and influence of local actors. Under the heading of “localisation,” efforts are also being made in the areas of development and peacekeeping to leave as much decision-making power as possible to local actors. Terms such as “local ownership” and “capacity building” have become prominent. However, a criticism of the approach is that it often remains unclear what exactly is meant by “local” and who should represent the local. The Civilian Peace Service from Germany is doing some pioneering work in attempting to shape international cooperation, especially in the field of peace promotion, in a partnership-based manner. Nonetheless, tensions remain: power imbalances between locally and internationally acting civil society organisations manifest themselves, for example, in project durations and financing opportunities – and civil society in the country programs primarily appears as a project partner (Ruppel 2023).[4]
Heterogeneous Engagement and a Common Vision
In summary, it can be noted that “civil society” is very heterogeneous, both in its political orientation and in its level of organisation. However, when speaking of civil society – particularly in comparison to movements (like for example the peace movement) – there seems to be a notion of organisation that is accompanied by a trend towards the professionalisation of engagement. In many cases, understanding the workings of the UN system or grasping a specific programme logic is crucial for the success of civil society engagement on the international stage.
More important than the professionalism of organisational structures per se, however, seems to be the grasp of political issues and the understanding of conflicts, in order to influence relevant processes and decisions at the UN or the state representatives. A skilful selection of political forces and places for such interventions, along with a media-effective staging, appear therefore to be essential.
Although much at the UN is in need of reform, its multilateral forums provide a negotiating framework for global issues such as non-violent conflict resolution, fair trade agreements, protection of human rights, as well as the preservation of natural habitats and resources. They also allow for the networking and pooling of civil society forces, thereby enabling local engagement to be placed in a larger context. Holding onto international law and the vision of peaceful coexistence gains particular significance in times of war.
[1] This article has developed out of a panel discussion on the topic „Civil Society and the UN“ which took place at the 40-year-symposium of the Journal Wissenschaft und Frieden (W&F, Engl.: Science and Peace) and has originally been published in German in Wissenschaft und Frieden 2023/4, p. 28-31.
[2] Andreas Zumach is a publisher, author, and was a long-time UN correspondent in Geneva reporting for various German newspapers.
[3] Schmelter, S. (2021): Humanitäres Regieren und die Flucht aus Syrien. Ethnographische Untersuchungen zum Migrations- und Grenzregime im Libanon. Doktorarbeit, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen. DOI: doi.org/10.53846/goediss-8238.
[4] Ruppel, S. (2023): Lokal verankerte Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung zwischen Partnerschaft und Machtungleichgewicht. Studien des Leibniz-Instituts Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Wiesbaden: Springer.
Susanne Schmelter, May 2024